These cases develop an entirely different method of analysis -one that does not include, for example, levels of scrutiny, fundamental rights, or suspect classes. 8 Further, the Oregon analysis is based on the particular language of the Oregon Constitution 9 as well as its historical, political, and cultural context. 10 It is sensitive to the general philosophy of Oregon constitutional jurisprudence as developed by the state's appellate courts over recent decades. 11 To refine her understanding of the case law, the Oregon attorney can also refer to a variety of scholarly articles devoted to the state equality guarantee. 12 In short, her research will quickly lead her to a richly textured, locally rooted state constitutional discourse, the lexicon of which she can then employ in fashioning her own contribution.
The Oregon practitioner could also find original, thorough, and coherent analyses of other frequently litigated provisions of the Oregon Constitution -analyses based in most cases on distinctly local history, text, culture, and traditions. For example, in Oregon, where Altschul v. State, 144 P. 124 (Or. 1914); White v. Holman, 74 P. 933 (Or. 1904) ; In re Oberg, 28 P. 130 (Or. 1891). 8. I have described this analysis as follows: The first step ... is to classify the challenged discrimination as implicating either a true class [i.e., a pre-existing, socially-recognized self-conscious group], a "pseudo-class" [i.e., a group created or called into existence by the challenged state action itself, with no prior existence as a group], or an individual. Each of these types of discrimination is governed by different principles and rules. The government may not discriminate against a true class if the class is based on some immutable social or personal characteristic, and the classification derives from an invidious prejudice or stereotype. "Pseudo-class" discrimination is impermissible when the law does not leave entry into that class open on the same terms to all citizens. Distribution of privileges or immunities to individuals must proceed according to systematic criteria consistently applied; ad hoc, haphazard treatment, or treatment based on other impermissible or unauthorized criteria will be unlawful. David Schuman, The Right to ''Equal Privileges and Immunities'~· A State 's Version of "Equal Protection," 13 VT. L. REV. 221, 244-45 (1988) (citations omitted).
9. Article I, § 20 of the Oregon Constitution reads: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens." The Supreme Court of Oregon has noted that this provision guarantees equality not only to all classes of citizens, but to all citizens as individuals. This latter guarantee ensures that the state cannot distribute benefits or burdens unsystematically. State v. Clark, 630 P.2d 810, 814 (Or. 1981) .
10. See Clark, 630 P.2d at 814. The court noted that the Oregon Constitution's equality provision predates the abolition of slavery, originating at a time when equality jurisprudence focused not on claims against oppression but against special privilege. 630 P.2d at 814. In fact, the population that ratified this provision also ratified a provision barring the immigration of blacks into the state. See OR. CoNST. art. I, § 35 (repealed 1926 the supreme court eschews judicial balancing 13 and the constitutional free speech guarantee prohibits government restraint of expression "on any subject whatever," 14 the only permissible speech limitations are those that were well established when the constitutional guarantee was adopted and that the guarantee was manifestly not designed to eliminate -such as liability for perjury or fraud. 15 Thus, noting that "Oregon's pioneers brought with them a diversity of highly moral as well as irreverent views," and that "most members of the Constitutional Convention of 1857 were rugged and robust individuals dedicated to founding a free society unfettered by the governmental imposition of some people's views of morality on the free expression of others," the Oregon Supreme Court has held that the Oregon Constitution protects even pornographic or obscene expression.16 Contrary to Gardner's thesis, the Oregon experience demonstrates what every Oregon lawyer knows: state constitutional law does not have to be infrequent, grudging, obscurely reasoned, unoriginal, or silent with respect to local history and culture. A state -even an outof-the-way and relatively new one like Oregon -can develop a strikingly independent universe of constitutional references and a constitutional culture completely distinct from the one used by the U.S. Supreme Court. This is not to say that many states have done so. Gardner is surely correct in his conclusion that state constitutional discourse in most jurisdictions, including the ones he surveys, is impoverished.17 But as the Oregon experience demonstrates, once it becomes clear that a state's highest court is serious about the primacy and independence of 13 State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 16 (Or. 1987) . Oregon search·and-seizure jurisprudence is equally independent. For example, the definition of search has nothing to do with anybody's "reasonable expectation of privacy," Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring), but with whether or not the official conduct in question, if indulged in by government agents at will, would reduce the people's freedom from unwanted scrutiny. State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040 , 1048 (Or. 1988 . Nor may state officials conduct an "administrative search" whenever the government's need outweighs the individual's; rather, the search must be authorized by either judicial warrant or legislation defining the purpose and scope of the intrusion. See State v. Bridewell, 759 P.2d 1054 (Or. 1988 ; cf. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (upholding administrative search under U.S. Constitution).
17. I suggest that this has nothing to do with inherent qualities of state constitutionalism. Rather, the reason is that state supreme court judges must introduce, demand, and subsequently nurture constitutional discourse. This is not an easy task. Presented with the option of either plugging particular facts into the U.S. Supreme Court's latest balancing test or multipronged analysis, or fashioning a coherent and original interpretation of the state charter from its text, history, and preincorporation case law, most judges facing overcrowded appellate dockets (not to mention lawyers facing cost-conscious clients) opt for the former. the state constitution, lawyers and lower courts will begin to participate vigorously in the development of a rich and useful discourse. Because this experience proves that a carefully, patiently, and systematically cultivated state constitutionalism can produce such discourse, the inference to draw from the failure in o~her jurisdictions is not, as Gardner argues, that they should practice less state constitutionalism, but that they should practice it more and better. 18 Gardner's argument, in any event, is that more state constitutional law is not only undesirable, but impossible. Acknowledging that my proposal for a state constitutionalism based on local culture is a "powerful" narrative that "hold[s] out the greatest hope for ... independent state constitutional discourse," 19 Gardner nevertheless argues that this hope "make[s] no sense" because (1) state constitutions do not in fact describe distinctive and coherent ways of life, (2) state constitutionalism is incompatible with national constitutionalism, and (3) as a people we have chosen to resolve this incompatibility in favor of the nation. 20 The existence of a distinctive and thriving state constitutional law in at least one jurisdiction refutes these arguments. They also fail on their own terms.
At the core of Gardner's assertion that state constitutions do not reflect significant local variations in culture is his observation that many of the distinctive provisions in state constitutions are either trivial, 21 "the result of pluralistic logrolling," 22 or both. Thus, he argues, they are incapable of revealing anything meaningful about the citizenry's character or addressing that character in appropriately distinctive language. But courts in most instances should have no difficulty 18. Perhaps I am more reluctant than Gardner to abandon "impoverished" state constitutionalism in favor of its "successful,'' "rich," and "vigorous" federal analogue because I find recent federal constitutionalism to be impoverished-not because it is increasingly conservative, but because it is increasingly petulant, shrill, formulaic, and intellectually incoherent. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 , 2678 (1992 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling majority opinion "bulldozer,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2679; "embarrassment," 112 S. Ct. at 2681; "psychology practiced by amateurs,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2681; "beyond the absurd,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2682; "distortion[] of the record,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2683; "precious,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2683; "bedeviled (so to speak),'' 112 S. Ct. at 2685;.and "a jurisprudential disaster,'' 112 S. Ct. at 2685); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) (characterizing issue as whether Constitution contains fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy; concluding respondent's claim that Constitution protects right to choose intimate companions is "facetious"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (calling objection, on Establishment Clause grounds, to city-sponsored celebration of birth of Christ a "stilted overreaction"); San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (refusing to subject unequal school funding scheme to heightened scrutiny because case presents no "suspect class" or "fundamental right").
19. Gardner's "incompatibility" argument presents the following syllogism: America is a national community with a shared culture of universal norms enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. State constitutionalism presumes state communities of shared norms that are "different" or "incompatible" with the national one. Thus, since "only one constitution at a time can ever truly and safely reflect the essential character and fundamental values of a people," 24 giving emphasis to state constitutions will lead to dangerous Balkanization.
The first problem with this reasoning is its major premise, which uses the inherently oxymoronic phrase national community. But even conceding that such a thing could exist, it does not follow that it must displace smaller, included communities. As observers of America since de Tocqueville have noted, we are a nation of overlapping and layered loyalties encompassing a multitude of communities, 25 many of which (for example, church and state) are far from incompatible.
23. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 31 J. LEGAL Eouc. 167 (1987) . In describing a constitution, Pitkin notes the two senses in which the word is used in our language: first, as "composition or fundamental make-up, .
•. characteristic frame or nature," or what a stranger would learn of us from watching our conduct; and second, as "founding, framing, shaping something anew." Id. at 167-68; see also Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) (distinguishing "ordinary" from "extraordinary" lawmaking).
24. Gardner, supra note 1, at 827-28. Gardner's reference to "different or incompatible values" 26 glosses over a crucial distinction. Federal constitutional values do not compete with "different" state ones in the sense that they present citizens with "incompatible" choices. Under the Guaranty Clause2 7 and the Supremacy Clause, 28 citizens are never free to choose substantive state values that conflict with federal ones; they can only choose state values that add to or embellish them. It makes no sense to argue that a value revealed by a more expansive right conflicts with the value revealed by a lesser one. This fact stems from the nature of constitutional values: they define what citizens have, not what they lack. The value embedded in the First Amendment has to do with how much freedom of expression Americans have, not how much authority to stifle it the government has. The Fourth Amendment declares that Americans value freedom from unreasonable searches; it does not declare that Americans value governmental authority to conduct all other searches. If the citizens of Oregon choose to protect pornographic expression29 instead of allowing it to be criminalized, or to require warrants or legislative authorization even for so-called "administrative" searches, 30 they are not in conflict with differing federal value choices; the U.S. Supreme Court has simply said that Americans, through their Constitution, value at a minimum the freedom to engage in certain forms of expression and to be free from certain forms of government scrutiny. States remain free, in other words, to add to the national values given voice in the U.S. Constitution, which constitute a core, an irreducible minimum. An Oregonian shares fundamental constitutive values with all Americans and also a larger set with all other Oregonians.
The problem, then, is not incompatibility but choice. Noting the "vigor of federal constitutional discourse," 31 Gardner concludes that " [t] he tension between state and national constitutionalism has been largely resolved in the modem day United States by the collapse of meaningful state identity and the coalescence of a social consensus that fundamental values in this country will be debated and resolved on a national level." 32 The social consensus in favor of national constitutionalism, however, did not result from some inherent national 26. Gardner, supra note 1, at 824. 27. U.S. CoNST Further, the "collapse of meaningful state identity" is as much a result of the hegemony of national constitutionalism as its cause. The relationship between identity and constitution is reciprocal and complex: identity creates constitution, and constitution creates identity. The Warren Court is at least partly responsible for shaping a generation of lawyers, scholars, politicians, and ordinary citizens who believe that the constitution means the U.S. Constitution and have therefore lost the habit of regarding a state as a political body that can have its own constitutional identity. As the Oregon example demonstrates, that habit of mind can be recaptured. For those of us who believe that the nation is too large a polity ever to achieve meaningful community, the recent weakening of distinctive state identities argues for a vital state constitutionalism as a restorative tonic.
Professor Gardner accurately depicts the depressed condition of state constitutional discourse in many jurisdictions. From that perfectly reasonable premise, he moves to an argument that state courts should abandon their attempts to improve it because that endeavor is inherently impossible and, in any event, undesirably schismatic. This argument ultimately fails, because he provides no convincing evidence that the development of sophisticated and vigorous state constitutional law is either impossible or unwise. By contrast, Oregon, as just one example, has shown that a state can develop a sophisticated independent constitutional culture without any noticeable threat to national values. 33 . Id. at 806.
